The Supreme Court on Monday agreed to examine a petition filed by a rape survivor seeking the removal of a judicial officer from a special court dealing with child sexual abuse cases, while the officer himself faces prosecution in a rape case in Delhi.
A Bench headed by Chief Justice of India Surya Kant issued notice to the Allahabad High Court administration and to Additional District Judge Ashok Bhartendu, and said it would also look into the progress of a vigilance complaint lodged against him.
The Bench, which also comprised Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V Mohana, was hearing a challenge to an August 17 order of the Allahabad High Court. That order had dismissed the survivor's writ petition seeking a writ of quo warranto against Bhartendu's continuance in office as the presiding officer of a court designated under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, or POCSO Act, in Kairana in Shamli district of Uttar Pradesh.
The High Court had held that there was a presumption that the administration knew what it was doing, since the officer had continued to discharge his duties.
Appearing for the survivor, advocate Rakesh Kumar Singh placed the central irony of the case before the court in stark terms. A higher judicial officer who is himself an accused in a rape case, and against whom cognisance has already been taken, is continuing as a POCSO judge, he submitted. The officer's petition seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings is pending, Singh pointed out, but there is no stay on those proceedings.
"There is no disciplinary enquiry against the erring official. He is coming in the way for the trial to be concluded. At least, he may be absolved from judicial duties," Singh urged.
The Bench initially indicated that it was not inclined to absolve Bhartendu of his duties at this stage, remarking to the petitioner that she should proceed with the criminal case. But as Singh pressed the argument that administrative action had stalled, the court shifted its approach.
Singh invoked the Supreme Court's constitutional powers of superintendence over the subordinate judiciary, pointing to a Constitution Bench ruling, and argued that the High Court administration needed to be pushed to act.
Justice Bagchi observed that the survivor had complained to the vigilance department but had not been informed about the progress of her complaint, and that no visible progress had been made in the matter. "So that we will address and direct the High Court to take the necessary steps and take it to its logical conclusion. We will keep our observations limited to the disciplinary proceedings," he said.
When Singh reiterated the prayer to divest Bhartendu of his judicial duties, the court maintained that the High Court should take that call. "We will leave that to the High Court," the Bench said.
The court, however, made it clear that it would not directly strip the officer of his post. Instead, it issued notice on the petition and indicated that it may ask the Allahabad High Court to speed up the pending vigilance inquiry. The matter has been posted for further hearing in December, by which time the High Court administration and the officer are expected to have filed their responses.
The dispute traces back to a first information report registered on December 8, 2022, at the Mayur Vihar Phase-I police station in Delhi. The FIR, registered under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, alleged sexual assault on the false promise of marriage. Bhartendu challenged the FIR before the Delhi High Court.
In March 2023, that court granted him interim protection against arrest, taking a prima facie view that the case appeared to be one of breach of promise to marry rather than a false promise made at the inception of the relationship.
Crucially, however, the Delhi High Court later clarified that there was no stay on the trial court proceedings, and directed the trial court to proceed in accordance with law once the chargesheet was filed. Pursuant to those directions, the Karkardooma district court in Delhi took cognisance of the offences against Bhartendu.
The trial court also rejected his application seeking redaction of his name from the case records, holding that redaction could not be permitted before his committal. With the formal committal in the trial still pending before the Delhi court, the survivor moved the Supreme Court, contending that a judicial officer facing rape prosecution cannot be permitted to continue adjudicating sensitive sexual assault cases under the POCSO Act.
The case raises difficult questions about institutional propriety and public confidence in the justice system. POCSO courts handle some of the most sensitive cases in the criminal justice system, involving child victims of sexual offences, and the credibility of those proceedings depends heavily on the standing of the presiding officer.
The petitioner's argument is not that guilt has been established against the officer, since the criminal trial against him is still at an early stage, but that the appearance of a conflict is itself damaging. A judge who is an accused in a sexual offence case, the argument runs, should not sit in judgment over similar cases until the proceedings against him are resolved.
The courts have long wrestled with the balance between the rights of an accused, who is presumed innocent until proven guilty, and the institutional interest in keeping the judiciary above suspicion. The Allahabad High Court's August order leaned towards the former consideration, treating the officer's continuance in service as a matter for the administration.
The Supreme Court's intervention does not overturn that order at this stage, but it signals that the top court is unwilling to let the vigilance process drift without scrutiny. By asking for the state of the inquiry, the Bench has put the spotlight on a process that the petitioner says has shown no visible movement.
The case also highlights the slow pace at which disciplinary and criminal processes can move in parallel. The FIR is now nearly four years old, the quashing petition remains pending without a stay, and the committal in the trial court is yet to take place. During that period, the officer has continued to hold a sensitive judicial posting. For the survivor, that passage of time is itself part of the grievance, since each delay prolongs a situation she describes as untenable.
What happens next will depend substantially on what the Allahabad High Court administration tells the Supreme Court about the vigilance inquiry. If the inquiry is shown to be progressing, the court may leave the administrative decision to the High Court, as it has indicated. If it emerges that the process has stalled, the court may direct that it be taken to its logical conclusion within a defined timeframe.
Either way, the December hearing is likely to bring sharper clarity to a case that sits at the intersection of judicial accountability, victims' rights and the presumption of innocence.
For now, the Supreme Court has done what appellate courts often do at the threshold of such cases: it has asked questions, sought responses and refused to prejudge the outcome. But the fact that it chose to entertain the petition at all, and to frame the vigilance inquiry as a live issue, marks a significant step for the survivor's four-year-old fight for an answer.
(Reporting based on Bar and Bench, Live Law and Outlook.)